Wednesday, February 11, 2009

The Geithner "plan"

We start with this from yesterday's New York Times:
WASHINGTON— The Obama administration’s new plan to bail out the nation’s banks was fashioned after a spirited internal debate that pitted the Treasury secretary, Timothy F. Geithner, against some of the president’s top political hands.

In the end, Mr. Geithner largely prevailed in opposing tougher conditions on financial institutions that were sought by presidential aides, including David Axelrod, a senior adviser to the president, according to administration and Congressional officials.

Mr. Geithner, who will announce the broad outlines of the plan on Tuesday, successfully fought against more severe limits on executive pay for companies receiving government aid.

He resisted those who wanted to dictate how banks would spend their rescue money. And he prevailed over top administration aides who wanted to replace bank executives and wipe out shareholders at institutions receiving aid.
Those paragraphs should send chills down the spine of anyone who knows Geithner's track record in his previous endeavors. And besides being a vague plan headed by someone that I zero faith in, the stuff he did reveal isn't great either.

In an post criticizing the plan, Bob Borosage explains first explains the banking crisis in as well as I've seen anywhere:

The plan isn't likely to get the administration where it needs to go for two simple reasons. It is wrong about where we are starting from. And it is wrong about where we're going to. If you don't know where you are and don't know where you are going, it is very hard to get there.

The plan won't admit where we are: the major banks in the US are insolvent. They aren't addled by a temporary fever. They are broke. If they actually marked their toxic paper to the market price - where there is one - their losses would wipe out their capital, even including the billions kicked in by the government in the first round. Clearly, the Obama administration - like the Bush administration before it - hasn't accepted that reality.

Further explination from an email to the politco:(via Ezra)
An oft-quoted investment banker e-mails us: “There is no capital in the entire global financial system. None. When I say ‘financial,’ I mean banks, hedge funds, private equity funds, homeowners and other leveraged players. There is some capital among the ‘real money’ players such as sovereign wealth funds and central banks. And the U.S. can ‘print’ some. But that's it. … The problem with the distressed assets is not that there are no buyers. There are plenty of buyers; I speak to them every day. The problem is there are no sellers; that is, the banks won't sell. Because to sell is to book a loss on what you have sold and what remains. And to do that is to die. That's what it means to be insolvent.
Borosage continues on about why Geithner's plan isn't designed to fix the problem:

The plan won't get us where we need to go: we need to restructure - and downsize - our financial sector. Its baroque excesses - billions in bonuses, golden parachutes, million dollar office renovations, $35,000 "commodes on legs," $50 million private jets, legions of employees - were constructed atop a housing bubble that finally burst. Now the banks and financial houses must be downsized, chastened, and regulated. As President Obama stated, "the party is over." But the administration's plan envisions a restoration, not a restructuring. We don't want to go there even if we could afford it.

Martin Wolf, the lead economics writer for the establishment Financial Times, notes that the plan was constrained by three assumptions: no nationalization, no losses for bondholders, no new money from the Congress.

No nationalization rules out the way the US normally deals with insolvent banks. The FDIC takes them over, replaces the management; the depositors are reassured, the shareholders take their losses to write off the bad debts. Then the FDIC restructures the bank, merges it or sells it back to private investors. It arranges an orderly and seemly burial. Without doing this with banks that are "too big to fail," the administration is left paying tribute to zombie banks that consume taxpayers' money while doing little if any productive banking.

No losses for bondholders means that taxpayers pick up the bill. With an insolvent bank, shareholders lose their investment. That's how the market works. If that isn't enough to cover the losses, then creditors take what is called "a haircut." A portion of the loan they made to the bank is written off or turned into equity (stock). But with neither the shareholders nor the creditors taking the hit, only taxpayers are left.

As dire as this sounds, the hope is that while Obama has ruled out nationalization, and it goes against everything that Tim Geithner and Larry Summers believe in, they may not end up having a choice.

The question becomes when they realize that it needs to be done, and how much taxpayer money we've thrown away while waiting for them to figure it out.

1 comment:

  1. Really wish we weren't living in a world where 'zombie banks' are actual things that are legitimately scary.

    ReplyDelete